As far as the causal and conditional dependence between effect and cause is concerned, we have to note that the conception of svabhāvaḥ, and consequently of parabhāvaḥ (as a preliminary discussion see A brief note on the distinction between “cause” and “condition” in early Buddhism), during Nāgārjuna’s times had developed some problematic aspects, which Nāgārjuna had to face up to.
(a) The Sarvāstivāda school, interpreted the Buddhist idea of impermanence (P. aniccatā; S. anityatā, T. mi rtag nyid) by means of the theory of momentariness (S. kṣaṇikatvavādaḥ, T. skad cig nyid smra ba).1 According to this theory, every existent we can have experience of, is nothing but a series of distinct and not communicating instantaneous dharmāḥ. The extreme separation between a preceeding (dharmaḥ1) and a following (dharmaḥ2) element of a same series needs the intervention of something that could assure – and justify our perception of – the continuity of that series. This “something” is, precisely, the svabhāvaḥ, which was thus thought to be an intrinsic nature underlying the serial event. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the dharmaḥ2 is by two forces (S. prāptiḥ, «appropriation», and aprāptiḥ, «non appropriation»)2 led to present itself exaclty after the dharmaḥ1, the dharmaḥ3 exactly after the dharmaḥ2, and so on. It is by virtue of these two powers that the svabhāvaḥ can be, in some way, “preserved” during all the series, and “inherited” by the following dharmaḥ from the preceeding one. Because the process involving the same series of dharmāḥ is based on the centrality of svabhāvaḥ (which at a certain point of the philosophical debate started to assume a strong metaphysical sense), this, on the one hand, pushed the Sarvāstivādins to deny any parabhāvaḥ in a causal relation – which would have meant the intrusion of an external dharmaḥ in a series to which it has not to belong –3 and, on the other hand, forced them to accept the potential existence of the effect into the cause (S. satkaryavādaḥ).4
(b) The Sautrāntikas, although critical of the svabhāvavādaḥ of the Sarvāstivādins, nonetheless accepted the kṣaṇikatvavādaḥ.5 Thus if, on the one side, they did not admit a svabhāvaḥ, on the other side, they had to accept a parabhāvaḥ to justify causal relations. By the acceptance of the parabhāvaḥ, the Sautrāntikas had to admit a theory, according to which the effect is (must be!) completely different from the cause (S. asatkaryavādaḥ).6 In the words of the Peṭakopadeso, if the Sarvāstivādins uphold only the internal cause (P. ajjhattiko sabhāvo), the Sautrāntikas, on the contrary, by negating any possibility of such a cause, accept only the external condition (P. bahiro parabhāvo).7 In both cases, Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, for allowing a consistent explanation of the fact that the cause or the condition – which, both, are not supposed to enter in contact with their effects – bring about their fruits, a sort of force belonging to the cause or to the condition has logically to be presupposed. This force is called in Sanskrit arthakriyākāritvaṃ («the activity of bringing about an effect»), a word conveying the sense of «causal efficiency», which represents a sort of – actually not well defined – trait-d’union between the antecedent cause and the consequent effect.8
(c) There is also the case of Buddhist schools – for instance the so-called Vaipulyaka – which, by admitting that all is empty (S. sarvaṃ śūnyaṃ) – where emptiness (śūnyatā) implies absence of bhāvaḥ –, denied both sva-bhāvaḥ and para-bhāvaḥ.9 This perspective stands closely near to Nihilism.
Nāgārjuna is equally critic in respect of all these three positions, as we can notice from the opening stanza of the MMK, in which he clearly states: na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpi ahetutaḥ | utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana || («Not produced from itself, not from other, not from both [itself and other], not without cause, are anywhere any events whatsoever evident at all»).10
(1) On the kṣaṇikatvavādaḥ see, principally: Sinha (1977-1978); Gupta (1980), dealing with Dharmakīrti’s position; Chattopadhyay (1993); von Rospatt (1995); Inada (1996). See, moreover, Dasgupta (1997:158-162). A clear analysis of Nāgārjuna criticism of this theory, on account of its logical implications, has been propounded by Oetke (1990). The Mahāvibhāṣā (II century A.D.) theorizes a «momentary (kṣaṇika) causation, as when all twelve moments of the chain [of pratītya-samutpādaḥ] are realized in a single moment of action», but also a «serial (sāmbandhika) causation, in which dependent origination is viewed in reference to the relationship between cause and effect» (Potter 1996:114).
(2) The role of prāptiḥ would be to collect all the dharmāḥ belonging to the same series, and to activate the right dharmaḥ in the right instant, that of aprāptiḥ would be to keep far from a particular series all the dharmāḥ which do not belong to it. See, among others, Ganguly (1994).
(3) To tell the truth, the matter is not so simple as it could appear from a superficial glance. Indeed, the interpreters of Abhidharma (Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas) admitted four kinds of pratyayaḥ: hetu-pratyayaḥ («the condition working as cause»; see AK II, 61d; criticized in MMK I, 7), ālambana-pratyayaḥ («the supporting condition»; see AK II, 62c; criticized in MMK I, 8), samanantara-pratyayaḥ («the immediately contiguous condition»; see AK II, 62ab; criticized in MMK I, 9) and adhipati-pratyayaḥ («the extensive condition»; see AK II, 62d; criticized in MMK I, 10; see also Kalupahana 1996:113-114). And six kinds of hetuḥ (AK II, 49-56 and Bhāṣyaḥ thereon). Whereas, on the one side, the primary cause (karaṇa-hetuḥ) has been distinguished from these four conditions – and, in primis, from hetu-pratyayaḥ (see, for instance, Bhāṣyaḥ ad AK II, 61d: kāraṇa-hetu-varjyāḥ pañca hetavo hetu-pratyayaḥ, «with the exception of kāraṇa-hetuḥ, the [other] five causes [constitute] the hetu-pratyayaḥ»; on the six causes, kāraṇa-hetuḥ plus pañca hetavaḥ, see AK II, 49 and Vyākhyā thereon; Śāstrī 1998:221) –, this distinction appears not only weak, but also not so persuasive even to the eyes of its upholders, who seem not to be interested in any strong philosphical defence of it, as we can infer from, for instance: Vyākhyā ad AK II, 49 (hetunāṃ ca kaḥ prativiśeṣaḥ na kaścit-ity-āha | […] hetuḥ pratyayo nidānaṃ kāraṇaṃ nimittaṃ liṅgam-upaniṣad-iti paryāyāḥ |; «Is there a peculiarity of causes [as distinct from conditions]? It has been said “No one.” […] hetuḥ, pratyayaḥ, nidānaṃ, kāraṇaṃ, nimittaṃ, liṅgaṃ, and upaniṣad are synonyms»; this reminds us DN II, 55-71); AK II, 49, where the pañca hetavaḥ are said explicitly to belong to hetuḥ, and not to pratyayaḥ, compared with Bhāṣyaḥ ad AK II, 61d; AK II, 62d (kāraṇākhyo’dhipaḥ smṛtaḥ), explained by Bhāṣyaḥ ad AK II, 62d: ya eva kāraṇa-hetuḥ sa evādhipati-pratyayaḥ («That which is the primary cause is exaclty the extensive condition»). The fact is that, on the one hand, the Sarvāstivādins, by upholding the satkāryavādaḥ, could not admit an external condition (thus, for them, any condition is, ultimately, a cause) and, on the other hand, the Sautrāntikas – as we will see in the following point (b) –, with their asatkāryavādaḥ, could not admit an internal cause, thus reducing every cause to the level of a condition. The obvious confusion generated by the philosophical necessity to differentiate hetuḥ from pratyayaḥ (due to some post Canonical doctrinal developments such as Peṭ 104; this reflection invalidates, at least in part, the consideration of Scherrer-Schaub 1991:225, note 441, according to whom: «Alors que les écoles anciennes ne semblaient pas distinguer entre hetu et pratyaya […], la scolastique Sarvāstivāda introduisit une distinction»), on the one hand, and the failure – or the disinterest – in accomplishing this distinction (representing somehow the need to adhere faithfully to the doctrinal precepts of the Pāli Canon, as it is proved by the Vyākhyā ad AK II, 49, which is nothing but a reference to such a passages as DN II, 55-71; see also de la Vallée Poussin 1971:244-245, note 4, point a; furthermore, compare Yaśomitra’s S. upaniṣad, with P. upanisā in SN II, 31) by means of a consistent philosophical argumentation, on the other hand, has been detected by Nāgārjuna and pushed to its extreme (inconsistent) consequencies. See: MMK I, 7-10; MMK XX; ŚS 3; etc. Moreover: Stcherbatsky (1996:174-192); Murti (1955:168-170); Ramanan (1998:180-184). See also the interesting discussion on satkārya– and asatkāryavādaḥ in: Taber (1998).
(4) Of course, we have to remember that the satkāryavādaḥ was upheld also by other non-Buddhist schools, the most important among whom was undoubtedly the Sāṃkhya; see Larson (1998:160-167). In Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s (IV century A.D.) Sāṃkhya-kārikā 9, indeed, the philosophical motivations for the acceptance of this theory are put forward: asadakaraṇāt upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavā’bhāvāt | śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvācca satkāryam || («(1) Because there is not production of what is non existent [in the cause], (2) because of the grasping [of the effect] to [its] material cause, (3) because the production [of every effect] does not take place from every [cause], (4) because there is production of an efficient effect from an efficient cause, (5) because the production takes place: [because of all this] the effect is existent [in the cause]»). For a detailed discussion of this kārikā see Yukti-dīpikā (VII century A.D.): Kumar, Bhargava (1992, vol. 2:1-32). See, also, Potter (1991:106-111).
(5) Of course, the Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda versions of this doctrine differ from one another in crucial philosophical points. About the Sarvāstivāda perspective, de la Vallée Poussin (1932:7) explains: «Le kṣaṇa est ainsi nemmé parce qu’il est le temps le plus réduit (paramanikṛṣta kāla; sarvāntyo hi kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ); la période pendant laquelle, après un long futur et avant un long passé le Dharma est actif (sakāritra), c’est-à-dire présent. Les Dharmas présents, ayant cette mesure d’état de durée, sont nommés kṣaṇika, momentané» (my italics). About the Sautrāntika point of view, de la Vallée Poussin (1932:5) reminds us three definition of kṣaṇaḥ upheld by Vasubandhu in his AK, among which it is here relevant to consider the second one: «“Le temps dans lequel un Dharma en mouvement se déplace de la masure d’un atome” […] la seconde explication […] décrit l’infinimment petit de la durée en fonction de l’infinimment petit de l’étendue» (my italics). On the one side, according to the Sarvāstivādins, the «moment» is considered in its mere temporal extention, on the other side, according to the Sautrāntikas, the «moment» is determined on the relation between time and movement (is it agains this particular position that Nāgārjuna wrote MMK II). See also: AKV, 25-27 and Bhāṣyaṃ and Vyākhyā thereon; de la Vallée Poussin (1937).
(6) See, for instance, Ramanan (1998:180-184).
(7) This is also the perspective of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools. See the clear explanation in Stcherbatsky (2000:122), which can be applied to the Sautrāntika perspective: «The Realists, on the other hand, consider every object as a separate whole, a whole which is an additional unity to the parts out of which it is composed. When causation operates, this whole receives an increment, produces an aougrowth, a new whole is produced. Between the two wholes there is a bridge, […] a link which again is a separate unity. Every case of causation is therefore not a causation out of its own Self, but a causation ex alio, out of another Self.» Here the «Realists» are the Vaiśeṣikas, the Atomists; we have nonetheless to remember that also the Sautrāntikas were Atomists.
(8) On arthakriyākāritvaṃ see the clear explanation in Dasgupta (1997:163-164). Although it is not the case, here, to investigate the peculiar differences between the Sarvāstivādin and the Sautrāntika concepts of arthakriyākāritvaṃ, we can say that these differeces lie mostly in the distinct perspectives upheld by the two schools on the temporal development that a dharmaḥ undergoes, as Bastow (1994:489) reminds us: «The Sarvāstivādins believed that there is a sense in which basic entities, dharmas, of the past and future are real, that is, are real now. Dharmas are short-lived or momentary happenings. The Sarvastivadins claimed that the present happening of a dharma is merely one phase in its existence. Hitherto it has existed in its future phase; when causes and conditions are ripe, it moves into its present phase, and then when the moment of its actualization is past it moves into the third phase of its history and becomes a past dharma. So at the present moment there exist not only present dharmas, that is, dharmas in their present phase (bhāva), but also dharmas in their past and future phases. The experienced difference between these three modes of present existence is explained by a complex theory of different types of causal efficacy; the present bhāva is characterized by a particularly strong kind of causality called kāritra; dharmas in past and future bhāvas are also causally efficacious, but in a different way. So, in this sense, past, present, and future dharmas are contemporaneous; but it is a “reduced contemporaneity”, for dharmas in past and future phases are less forceful than dharmas in the present phase. This doctrine was in direct opposition to the opinion of the Sthaviras and the Sautrāntikas, that before its present moment of existence a dharma was nothing, and after this moment it will become nothing». The Sautrāntika negationism of Sarvāstivāda «contemporaneity» led this school to stress the importance of the concept of bījaṃ («seed»), which philosophically appears to refer to a subtle and pure element which in some way determines the links between antecedents and consequents in a conditional relation. See Jaini (1959).
(9) About the Vaipulyaka or Vaitulyaka (P. Vetullaka) we have few accounts. It seems that its upholders followed a doctrine of extreme emptiness; notwithstanding that, although in KathA 167, Minayeff ed., we read mahāsuññatavādasaṅkhātānañ ca vetullakānaṃ (we find other references to this school in KathA 171, 197), nonetheless, on the basis of the mainly moral subjects treated in Kath XVII, 6-10 (III century B.C.), to which the fragment quoted refers to, to Minayeff’s reading it is to prefer that of KathA 168, Jayawickrama ed.: mahāpuññavādasaṅkhātānaṃ ca vetullakānaṃ. According to historical cronicles, a structured vaitulyadāvaḥ was imported in Sri Lanka by the Abhayagirinivāsins during the reign of Vohārika Tissa (III century A.D.); see Rahula (1966:87), Chandra (1984), Baruah (2000:54, notes 277-279), Sujato (2006:55-56). We do not know if during Nāgārjuna’s times a sort of proto-Vaipulyaka school was already present in the panorama of Buddhist sects. All that we can infer is that the fundamental tenets of this school appear to have been – at least in the eyes of other Hīnayāna thinkers – closely related to some Mahāyāna principles (indeed the adjective vaipulyaḥ/-aṃ/-ā means «extensive», and refers occasionally to the “Great Sūtras” of the Mahāyāna; see: Nakamura, 1999:154) like, for instance, a kind of absolutism of the sort of that exposed in the Prajñāpāramitā literature (or even some philosophical aspects of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtraṃ), and we know that works belonging to Prajñāpāramitā tradition were not unknown to Nāgārjuna. Besides this, we have to note that the last chapter of the Samādhirāja-sūtraṃ «adduces reasons for describing it [i.e., the Sūtraṃ] as a Vaipulyasūtra» (Potter 1999:192). Paul J. Griffiths (Potter 1999:445), in summarizing Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya, writes: «The exact sense of the term vaipulya remains obscure. It may simply be an inclusive term for all Buddhist scriptures, including the Mahāyāna sūtras. The Abhidharmasamuccaya devotes a great deal of discussion to it, and to the benefits of studying the literature denoted by it». The existence of a Hīnayāna-Vaipulyaka point of view, related to Mahāyāna, is clearly pointed out by Kalupahana (1994:174), who reminds us that: «the Abhidharmadīpa [of Vimalamitra, VI century A.D.], a work of the neo-Sarvastivāda, refers to the Sautrāntikas as “those who have reached the portals of vaitulyaśāstra.” […] this statement of the neo-Sarvastivādins would be no more than an assertion that the essentialist Sautrāntika nominalism is what finally led to […] popular Mahāyāna»; Kalupahana, here, refers to Vimalamitra’s commentary on Abhidharmadīpaḥ called Abhidharmadīpa–vibhāṣāprabhāvṛttiḥ, Jaini (1959:101). On the attribution of the Abhidharmadīpaḥ to Vimalamitra, cosider: de Jong (1966). The same de Jong, about the critical position, in the Abhidharmadīpaḥ, against Vasubandhu, says (1966:305): «l’école Sautrāntika déjà était considerée comme étant au moins à mi-chemin du Mahāyāna».
(10) MMK I, 1. Compare with VV 51 and LS 21 (in which the term tārkikaiḥ, «by the logicians», restitute all the distance existing between morality, here expressed by the term duḥkhaṃ, «pain», and an ethically barren logic). Here it is relevant to note the use of the verb na… vidyante, which I have rendered as «they are not evident». Nāgārjuna, as G. Bugault (1983) has clearly pointed out, makes mainly use of three verbs in three different negative sentences: na yujyate («it is not proper»), na upapadyate («it is not appropriate»; litt. «one does not approach») and na vidyate («it is not evident»). Bugault (1983:24) explains: « na yujyate – logical or rational impossibility. What you state is inconceavable. Example: a barren woman’s son.  nopapadyate – an impossibility which, more or less according to the texts, is an impossibility of fact or reason: this can not exist. Example: a city floating in the sky.  na vidyate – factual non-existence. Look as much as you will, this will never be given to you in experience. Example: a coat made of tortois hair. Going from YUJ to upa-PAD, and then to VID, one passes from logical possibility to real possibility (or logical and real possibility). And with VID, to simply effective reality».
References 1 (texts):
– AK(B)(V)=(1) Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra (2 vols.), Śāstrī, D. (ed. by), Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi 1998; (2) L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu (5 vols.), de la Vallée Poussin, L. (traduction et annotation), nouvelle éd. anastatique présentée par É. Lamotte, Insitut Belge del Hautes Études Chinoises, Bruxelles 1971.
– DN=(1) Dīgha Nikāya (3 vols.), Rhys Davids, T.W., Carpenter, J.E. (ed. by), Pali Text Society, Oxford 1992-1995 (rep.); (2) Dialogues of the Buddha (3 vols.), Rhys Davids, T.W., Rhys Davids, C.A.F. (Engl. trans. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2000.
– KathA=(1) Kathāvattuppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā, Minayef, J.P. (ed. by), «Journal of the Pali Text Society» 3 (1889), pp. 1-199, 213-222 (facsimile reprint 1978); (2) Kathāvattuppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā, Jayawickrama, N.A. (ed. by), Pali Text Society, London 1979.
– LS=Lokātīta-stavaḥ, see Catuḥ-stavaḥ: =(1) “The Catustava of Nāgārjuna”, in On Voidness: A Study on Buddhist Nihilism, Tola, F., Dragonetti, C. (ed. and Engl. trans. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1995, pp. 101-153; (2) Catuḥstavaḥ of Ācārya Nāgārjuna, Namdol, G. (Hindi trans. and critically ed. in Sanskrit and Tibetan), Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath (Varanasi) 2001.
– MMK=(1) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, de Jong, J.W. (ed. by), The Adyar Library and Research Center, Madras 1977; (2) Madhyamakaśāstram of Nāgārjuna. With the Commentaries Akutobhayā by Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakavṛtti by Buddhapālita, Prajñāpradīpavṛtti by Bhāvaviveka, Prasannapadāvṛtti by Candrakīrti, Critically Reconstructed (2 vols.), Pandeya, R. (ed. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1988; (3) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, The Philosophy of the Middle Way, Kalupahana, D.J. (ed. and Engl. trans. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1996 rist.; (4) Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavrtti. Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain, accompagnés d’une introduction, de notes, et d’une édition critique de la version tibétaine, May, J. (ed. and Franch trans. by), A. Maisonneuve, Paris 1959.
– Peṭ=The Peṭakopadesa, Barua, A. (ed. by), Pali Text Society, London 1949.
– Saṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Text, Translation and Commentary Yuktidīpikā, ed. by N.C. Panda, S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, I. Dutt Uniyal, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2009. (see also Saṃkhyakārikā).
– SN=(1) Saṃyutta Nikāya (5 vols.), Feer, L. (vols. 2-5 ed. by), Pali Text Society, Oxford rist. 1975-1999 (rep.), Somaratne, G.A., (vol. 1 ed. by), Pali Text Society, Oxford 1998; (2) Rhys Davids, C.A.F., Woodward, F.L. (2005), The Book of the Kindred Sayings (5 vols.), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.; (3) The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (2 vols.), Bhikkhu Bodhi (Engl. trans. by), Wisdom Publication, Boston 2000.
– VV=The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Bhattacharya, K., Lohnston, E.H., Kunst, A. (ed. and Engl. trans. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1990 (rep.)
– Yuktidīpikā (2 vols.), S. Kumar & D. N. Bhargava (ed. and Engl. trans. by), Eastern Book Linkers, Delhi 1990.
– Yukti-ṣaṣṭika-kārikā(-vṛttiḥ)=(1) Nāgārjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Lindtner, Chr., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1987, pp. 100-119; (2) Yuktiṣaṣṭikavṛtti. Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai einsegnement de la causalité, par le maître indien Candrakīrti, Sherrer-Schaub, C.A. (éd. et trad. de la version tibétaine par), Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, «Mélanges chinois et bouddhique» 25, Bruxelles (1991).
References 2 (studies):
– Baruah, B., Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism, Sarup & Sons, New Delhi 2000.
– Bastow, D., The Mahā-Vibhāṣā Arguments for Sarvāstivāda, «Philosophy East and West» 44 (1994), pp. 489-499.
– Bugault, G., Logic and Dialectics in the Madhyamakakārikās, «Journal of Indian Philosophy» 11 (1983), pp. 7-76.
– Chandra, L., “Vaipulya sūtras and the tantras”, in L. Ligeti (ed. by), Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Körös, Akadémiai kiadó, Budapest 1984, pp. 99-115.
– Chattopadhyay, M., “Philosophical Approach to the Buddhist Theory of kṣaṇikatva”, in Aspects of Buddhism. Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume of the Sikkim Research Institute of Tibetology, Sikkim 1993, pp. 120-131.
– Dasgupta, S., A History of Indian Philosophy vol. 1, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1997 (rep.)
– de Jong, J.W., L’auteur de l’Abhidharmadīpa, «T’oung Pao» 52 (1966), pp. 305-307
– de La Vallée Poussin, M.L., Documents d’Abhidharma: la controverse du temps, «Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques» 5 (1937), pp. 7-158.
– de La Vallée Poussin, M.L., Notes sul le “moment” ou kṣaṇa des bouddhistes, «Rocznik Orientalistyczny» 8 (1932), pp. 1-9.
– Ganguly, S., “Sarvāstivāda-Vijñānavāda Controversy on Prāpti and Aprāpti in the Ch’en weishih lun of Hsüan Tsang. Translated from Chinese with Introduction and Notes”, in Singh, S. (ed. by), The Sarvāstivāda and Its Tradition, Department of Buddhist Studies, Delhi University, Delhi 1994, pp. 137-148.
– Gupta, R., The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness and its Presuppositions, «Journal of Indian Philosophy» 8 (1980), pp. 47-68.
– Inada, K.K., “The reflexive nature of momentariness (kṣaṇavāda)”, in Buddhism and the Emerging World Civilization. Essays in Honor of Nolan Pliny Jacobson, R. Puligandla and R. Lee Miller (ed. by), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale 1996, pp. 73-82.
– Jaini, P.S., The Sautrāntika Theory of “Bīja”, «Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies» 22 (1959), pp. 236-249.
– Kalupahana, D.J., A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and Discontinuities, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994.
– Larson, G.J., Classical Sāṃkhya. An Interpretation of its History and Meaning, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1998 (rep.)
– Murti, T.R.V., Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Allen & Unwin, London 1955.
– Nakamura, H., Indian Buddhism. A Survey with Bibliographical Notes, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1999 (rep.)
– Oetke, C., “On Some Non-Formal Aspects of the Proofs of the Madhyamakakārikās”, in J. Bronkhorst (gen. ed. by), Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference: Kern Institute, Leiden, August 23-29, 1987 vol. 2, D. Seyfort Ruegg, L. Schithausen (ed. by) Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka, Brill, Leiden 1990, pp. 91-109.
– Potter, K.H. (ed. by), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies vol. VII, Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A. D., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1996.
– Potter, K.H. (ed. by), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies vol. VIII, Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1999.
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