Let us examine one by one the four alternatives listed by Nāgārjuna in his MMK I,1 (and referred to in Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars destruens (1)).1
(1) The alternative na svatas («not from itself») is clearly the rejection of the Sarvāstivāda-like position. Here Nāgārjuna criticizes the conception of svabhāvaḥ («intrinsic nature»). If the svabhāvaḥ is what makes a thing to be exactly that thing, it follows that the intrinsic nature of the cause must be different from that of the effect, otherwise both cause and effect should be identical. Now, we have seen that, according to the Sarvāstivāda point of view, a particular event is nothing but a discrete series of completely different momentary dharmāḥ: this means that the dharmaḥ1 plays the role of cause in respect of the dharmaḥ2, the dharmaḥ2 in respect of the dharmaḥ3, and so on. What identifies all the series is exactly the svabhāvaḥ. Now, the svabhāvaḥ represents the internal cause, producing an effect. Thus, if we apply this perspective to the Sarvāstivāda position, it follows that dharmaḥ1 has to be understood as the internal cause of dharmaḥ2, which is its effect. At this point, we have to consider that, if dharmaḥ1 never enters in direct communication with dharmaḥ2 – as upheld by Sarvāstivādins –, how can it be an effective internal cause of that dharmaḥ2? So, it must be concluded that svabhāvaḥ can be the cause only of the dharmaḥ of which it is the intrinsic nature or, in other words, svabhāvaḥ is the causa sui of that dharmaḥ. Now, if it is true that svabhāvaḥ is the causa sui of every momentary dharmaḥ belonging to one series, and if this svabhāvaḥ is said to be identical in every moment of that very series (because it is – so to say – the metaphysical ground of any serial event), how could it be that different dharmāḥ can take place by means of the same svabhāvaḥ? The only logical answer must then be that cause and effect are identical.2 But if between cause and effect there is such an identity, then it follows that it is not possible to explain why the effect (for instance the sprout) is different from its cause (for instance the seed).3 Moreover, if the cause is already endowed with its effect (satkaryavādaḥ), it is not clear what makes the effect appear and why.4
(2) The na paratas («not from other») alternative is intended to refute theSarvāstivāda-like perspective. Nāgārjuna’s objection can be summarized in the following two points: (a) if you admit only a parabhāvaḥ, but not a svabhāvaḥ, this is a contradictory position because svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate || («it is called, indeed, parabhāvaḥ the intrinsic nature of another event»),5 and you are liable of the same criticism of point (1), because you have surreptiotiously to accept the existence of a svabhāvaḥ. (b) If you admit a total difference (and separatedness) between cause and effect (asatkaryavādaḥ), then it will never be possible to prove that that particular cause is the cause of that particular effect:6 not only any kind of relation between cause and effect would be invalidated, but in the complete independence of the two, this would also entail the necessary admission of a self-generated effect, shifting dangerously the discourse from parabhāvaḥ to ahetutas (the generation without cause).7
(3) The criticism to na dvābhyāṃ («not from both») alternative is twofold.8 Nāgārjuna employes (a) a positive-conjunctive argument, according to which, after having rhetorically admitted that the effect can be produced from the encounter of internal cause and external conditions – this must be thought as the combination (S. sāmagrī) of the perspectives (1) and (2) –, he asks his opponent whether that effect can be found in this combination or not.9 If yes, we are in front of the same dialectical problems occasioned by the satkāryavādaḥ in position (1); if not, we have to face up to such difficulties as those of the asatkāryavādaḥ of position (2). This analysis shifts the discussion from cause and/or conditions as considered separately, to the combination (sāmagrī) of them; in this way it is the combination itself that becomes a unique element of criticism: if the effect is in the combination we have satkāryavādaḥ,10 if it is not we have asatkāryavādaḥ. There is also a (b) negative-disjunctive argument, according to which, if we admit that the effect does not exist in the combination of cause and conditions, then both cause and conditions would be similar to non-cause and non-conditions.11
(4) As far as the na ahetutas («not without cause») alternative is concerned, this appears to me to be the refusal of such perspectives like those of the Vaipulyaka, about which Ramanan (1998:359, note 2) says: «The [Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-]Śāstra mentions Vaipulyakas as tending to view the world as a baseless illusion – which is a case of clinging to śūnyatā».12 As far as the theory of causality/conditionality is concerned, to consider the world as empty means to deny both svabhāvaḥ and parabhāvaḥ because if none bhāvaḥ is admitted, it follows that neither a sva-bhāvaḥ (an internal cause) nor a para-bhāvaḥ (an external condition) are logically acceptable. This position can be summarized as the negation of both (1) and (2), on account of which the Vṛttiḥ ad ŚS 6 says: ’bras bu yod pa yang ma yin med pa yang ma yin pa ni ’gal te | med pa dang yod pa dus gcig kho na yod pa ni ma yin no || («If the effect is neither existent nor non existent [in the cause], there is contradiction, [because] existence and non existence do not exist in the same time»).13 We find Nāgārjuna’s refusal of such a Nihilistic śūnyavādaḥ perspective in MMK XXIV, 1-6; in MMK XXIV, 1ab his fundamental objection is: yadi śūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ | («If all this [world] is empty, there is not rising [of the effect] nor passing away [of the cause]»). It must be remembered, of course, that the śūnyavādaḥ of Nāgārjuna does not represent an inclination towards Nihilism: śūnyatā ca na cocchedaḥ («And the emptiness is not annihilation»).14
From this brief sketch we have to retain ourselves far to the conclusion that Nāgārjuna’s position is a simple rejection of all the four (logical) possibilities concerning causation (satkāryavādaḥ, asatkāryavādaḥ, both satkāryavādaḥ and asatkāryavādaḥ, neither satkāryavādaḥ nor asatkāryavādaḥ). It is, indeed, important to note that, when Nāgārjuna makes use of the terms «cause» (hetuḥ) and/or «condition» (pratyayaḥ) in his couterarguments, he generally employs them as equivalents, respectively, to the Sarvāstivāda svabhāvaḥ, and to the Sautrāntika parabhāvaḥ,15 but when he speaks of its own conception of causal/conditional relation he weaks the meaning of these two terms, pauperizing them of their, so to say, ontological or metaphisical weight.16 When, on the other hand, Nāgārjuna wants to affirm his position in the middle of a counterargument against Sarvāstivādins and/or Sautrāntikas, he generally prefers to make use of pratyayaḥ instead of hetuḥ, and this because, as J.L. Garfield clarifies to us: «When Nāgārjuna uses the word “cause” (hetu [rGyu]), he has in mind an event or state that has in it a power (kriyā [Bya ba]) to bring about its effect, and has that power as part of its essence or nature (svabhāva [Rang bZhin]). When he uses the term “condition,” on the other hand (pratyaya [rKyen]), he has in mind an event, state, or process without any methaphysical commitment to any occult connection between explanandum and explanans».17 In this acceptation, according to Nāgārjuna the kind of relation signified by the term pratyayaḥ can occur only in the absence of any form of svabhāvaḥ: na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratyayādiṣu vidyate | avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate || («Certainly in the conditions, ect., of the events the intrinsic nature is not evident; [and] in the absence of intrinsic nature, [also] the other-nature is not evident»).18 Only without svabhāvaḥ, to use again Nāgārjuna’s vocabulary, things can effectively exist as being hetu-pratyaya-sāpekṣatvāt («by reason of cause and conditions»).19 In other words, if Nāgārjuna underlines an equation between hetuḥ and svabhāvaḥ, and if in a substantialistic perspective also pratyayaḥ acquires a svabhāvaḥ connotation (mutatis mutandis: parabhāvaḥ), nonetheless, because Nāgārjuna has these two words at his disposal, he prefers to make use of a pratyayaḥ devoid of intrinsic nature, in accordance with the doctrinal message on paṭicca-samuppādo of SN I, 1.
(1) The «four alternatives» (S. catuṣkoṭiḥ) are generally summarized as followes: A, ~A, both A and ~A, neither A nor ~A. An in-depth investigation of the catuṣkoṭiḥ is beyond the purpose of this article. For a clear treatment of this subject, see, among others: Seyfort Ruegg (1977), Bharadwaja (1984); Gunaratne (1986); Wayman (1997). For a treatment of these alternatives on account of – and their dialectical place in – Buddhist logic, see: Robinson (1957), Lance Factor (1983), Ghose (1987). Obviously, these are only some among numberless contributions on this subject.
(2) MMK XX, 20ab: ekatve phalahetvoḥ syād aikyaṃ janakajanyayoḥ | («If there is uniqueness of cause and effect, [there would be] identity of generating and generated»). See MMK xx, 19ab.
(3) MMK XX, 21ab: phalaṃ svabhāvasadbhūtaṃ kiṃ hetur janayiṣyati | («How the cause will generate an effect which is existent by virtue of the intrinsic nature?»).
(4) ŚS 6a: | ’bras yod ’bras dang ldan pa’i rgyu | («If the effect is existent, the cause [has to be already] endowed with the effect»). Compare with LS 17-18, in which Nāgārjuna examines the exaple of the seed and the sprout.
(5) MMK XV, 3cd.
(6) MMK XX, 20cd: pṛthaktve phalahetvoḥ syāt tulyo hetur ahetunā || («if there is distinction between effect and cause, the cause [would be] equal to a non cause»); ŚS 6b: | de med na ni rgyu min mtshungs | («if that [effect] does not exist [in the cause], the cause is similar to a non cause»); compare MMK XX, 10cd: hetus tiṣṭhann api kathaṃ phalena janayed vṛtaḥ || («the cause, even if it is present, [if it would be] covered by the effect, how would it generate it?»).
(7) See Stcherbatsky (2000:119-120), who summarises in the following way the criticism to our points (1) and (2): «A thing cannot be produced by another thing or by a personal will, because other things or persons are momentary existencies. They have no time to produce anything. […] Therefore the cause can exist no more when the effect is produced. The effect follows upon the cause, but it is not produced by it. It springs up, so to speak, out of nothing, because a simultaneous existence of cause and effect is impossible». Wayman (1997:11) notes that: «The denial of arising from another rejects the creator being (īśvara), and Kalupahana [(1976)] increases the list from a Jaina source for “caused by another”: destiny (niyati), time (kāla), God (īśvara), nature (svabhāva), and action (karma). The later buddhist logicians held a theory of efficiency [arthakriyākāritvaṃ] that belongs here. Murti [(1955:170)] incorreclty puts this kind of denial under the heading of asatkāryavāda». Although these reflections are correct, nonetheless, as far as the MMK are concerned, we have to notice, with Siderits (1988:312), that: «In Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (where his opponent is typically an Ābhidharmika) Nāgārjuna uses reductio arguments against various metaphysical theories […]. But in the pramāṇavāda section of Vigrahavyāvartanī, where his opponent is a Naiyāyika, he employs different strategy». See also Taber (1998:214): «Nāgārjuna’s refutation of causation in the first chapter of the MMK is usually taken to be directed against Abhidharma (Sarvāstivāda) philosophy. […] Indeed, the next verse will list the four types of causal condition (pratyaya) recognized in Abhidharma texts». Thus, although we cannot say with certainty that Nāgārjuna, in his MMK, does not treat non-Buddhist points of view, nonetheless we have to be aware of the fact that this work is mainly devoted to the discussion of those Buddhist perspectives (i.e., Abhidharma) which, in the eyes of Nāgārjuna, appear inconsistent with the original message of Gotama. On the basis of Siderits’s and Taber’s suggestions we can infer that, in MMK I, 1, Nāgārjuna has in mind some Abhidharmic subjects. We can thus conclude that, with na paratas, Nāgārjuna with all probability is making reference to the parabhāvaḥ conditional relation of the Sautrāntikas (note the conceptual proximity between, on the one hand, sva-tas and sva-bhāvaḥ, and on the other hand, para-tas and para-bhāvaḥ). In this particular case it appears that Murti is right, whereas Wayman is wrong, and the arthakriyākāritvaṃ, consequently, does not belong to the na paratas category (rather, it belongs to na dvabhyaṃ criticism).
(8) It is relevant here to remember that Ghose (1987:296-298) distinguishes the (A and ~A) case into two classes: contradictory and contrary. Jayatilleke (1998:334), observes that in Pāli Canon: «[…] in one place in the Saṃyutta Nikāya […] Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta converses with Citta and in the course of the discussion, the former makes the following two observations about the latter: (i) passantu yāva ujuko c’āyaṃ Citto gahapati yāva asaṭho… amāyāvi (p), i.e. see how upright, honest and sincere Citta, the householder, is. (ii) passantu yāva anujuko c’āyaṃ Citto gahapati yāva saṭho… māyāvi (~p), i.e. how Citta, the householder, is not upright, honest or sincere. Citta is anxious to show that Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta is contradicting himself and says, sace purimaṃ saccaṃ pacchimaṃ te micchā, sace pacchimaṃ saccaṃ purimaṃ te micchā, i.e. if your former statement (p) is true, your latter statement (~p) is false and if your latter statement (~p) is true, your former statement (p) is false. In other words, in the above situation when the statements are of the form p and ~p, it cannot be the case that both p and ~p are true (~(p.~p))». Robinson, commenting Jayatilleke’s reflection, adds a third option besides the two suggested by Ghose, which can be taken into consideration also as far as Nāgārjuna’s thought is concerned. Robinson, indeed, says that the two factors involved in such a kind of relation can be: «[…] sometimes contradictories (“finite or infinite in all respect”), sometimes contraries (“east or west”), and sometime just phrases containing opposites (“torments himself, or torments another”)»; R. H. Robinson, Review article of K. N. Jayatilleke’s Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, «Philosophy East and West», 19 (1969), p. 77: quoted from Rigopoulos (1993:120).
(9) MMK XX, 1-2: hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi | phalam asti ca sāmagryāṃ sāmagryā jāyate katham ti || hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi | phalam nāsti ca sāmagryāṃ sāmagryā jāyate katham ti || («If the effect is born by means of the collectivity of cause and conditions, and [if it] is in the collectivity, [then] how it is born from the collectivity? If the effect is born by means of the collectivity of cause and conditions, and [if it] is not in the collectivity, [then] how it is born from the collectivity?).
(10) See MMK XX, 3: hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryāṃ asti cet phalam | gṛhyeta nanu sāmagryāṃ sāmagryāṃ ca na grihyate || («If the effect is in the collectivity of cause and conditions, should it not be grasped in the collectivity? But [according to our experience] it is not grasped in the collectivity»).
(11) MMK XX, 4: hetoś ca pratyayānāṃ ca sāmagryāṃ nāsti cet phalam | hetavaḥ pratyayāś ca syur ahetupratyayaiḥ samāḥ || («If the effect is not in the collectivity of cause and conditions, then cause and conditions would be similar to non-cause and non-conditions»). Wayman (1997:11) reminds us that: «The denial of arising from both itself and another is the rejection of the Vaiśeṣika, who say the clay pot arises from itself (clay) and from the potter, wheel, sticks, etc. in fact, this theory is in both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which Dasgupta [(1997:320)], in agreement with Shastri [(1964:236)], calls the asatkāryavāda». Notwithstanding the fact that this explanation must be considered conceptually correct, I think that the na dvabhyaṃ perspective, in MMK I, 1, could, rather, refer to a denial of a composed point of view: not only the svabhāvaḥ puls parabhāvaḥ perspective (Sarvāstivādins plus Sautrāntikas), but also the svabhāvaḥ plus arthakriyākāritvaṃ perspective (of the Sarvāstivādins). In this acceptation, the problem has to be considered as follows: the svabhāvaḥ represents the «itself» of a thing – which, as we have seen, according to Nāgārjuna cannot produce anything else than itself –, whereas the arthakriyākāritvaṃ – which, according to Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, would be the effective force of production, in some way “emanated” by the cause –, because of its belonging to that thing, without nonetheless exaclty being that thing, represents the «from another». What can be said about Wayman suggestion is that probably here Nāgārjuna refers not to a Vaiśeṣika, rather to a Vaiśeṣika-like argumentation. Indeed, it appears that Nāgārjuna moves his counterargument by tacitly taking into consideration the conceptual background involved in the suffix –tvaṃ, which is generally used in Vaiśeṣika texts to denote every characteristic (S. guṇaḥ; see VS I, 6) belonging to a substance (S. dravyaṃ; see VS I, 16). Nāgārjuna affirms that, if something belongs to something else, this means that the two things are different; see Halbfass (1992:97): «genitive constructions that speak of [for instance] “the color of something” reflect a real state of affairs, a real relationship between distinct relata» (according to Nāgārjuna, there cannot exist any relationship between real, and for this reason distinct, things). Now, to affirm that these are two distinct relata means that, if the svabhāvaḥ of the Sarvāstivādins plays the role of dravyaṃ, in a cause/condition-effect relationship the arthakriyākāritvaṃ, to preserve its link to svabhāvaḥ, has necessarily to play the role of guṇaḥ. But, because arthakriyākāritvaṃ is involved in the process of causation of the effect, and because it is not a svabhāvaḥ, this means that it can be put in equation with parabhāvaḥ – or, at least, this is the logical consequence of such a reasoning. Moreover, if we consider that the equivalent Buddhist term for guṇaḥ is, generally, the Sanskrit lakṣaṇaṃ (P. lakkhaṇaṃ, T. mtshan nyid), we find that Nāgārjuna, in MMK V, 1-5, making use of his skill in logical and dialectical tricks, denies any possibility of an effective relationship between the characterized (in our case the cause) and the characteristic (in our case the arthakriyākāritvaṃ), if both, or even one of them, are thought to be endowed with svabhāvaḥ (of course, the same with parabhāvaḥ). If an effective relationship between svabhāvaḥ and parabhāvaḥ can not take place, how could them together produce something? For this reason Nāgārjuna says na dvabhyaṃ. See also: ŚS 27-28; LS 11.
(12) See Potter (2003:556), where Padmanabh S. Jain summarizes Vimalamitra’s Abhidharmadīpa–Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛttiḥ: «the Vaitulikas, characterized as ayogatāśūnyavādins (the Mādhyamika?) maintain that no factor exists in any of the three times». The equation between Vaitulikas and Mādhyamikas is not at all certain (even if the reference to factors that do not exist in past, present and future time could remember ŚS 6d: | dus gsum rnams su’ang ’thad ma yin |; VV 69 and Vṛttiḥ thereon; MMK XIX). Indeed, few pages later, Jain (Potter 2003:558) writes: «The Dīpakāra [Vimalamitra] undoubtedly has the Kośakāra [Vasubandhu] in mind when he says: “Here the Vaitulika, an apostate from the Sarvāstivāda […]”». The Vaitulikas are here obviously the Vaipulyakas.
(13) The same argumentation is employed by Nāgārjuna on account of «conditions» in MMK I, 6: naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo’rthasya yujyate | asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim || («A condition either of an existing object, or of a non-existing object is not proper; of what non-existing [object] is [it] condition? And of an existing [object], what need is there of a condition?»).
(14) MMK XVII, 20a. Compare with BV 58ab: | stong nyid rang bzhin du brjod pas | | gang zhig chad par smra ba min |. As far as the na ahetutas perspective is concerned, Wayman (1997:11-12) reminds us that: «The denial of arising without a cause (or by chance), is the rejection of the Lokāyata (the ancient materialistic school), which espouses the arising from self-nature. That school held that consciousness is just a mode of the four elements (fire, air, water, earth)». Among others, Sayāṇa-Mādhava (XIV-XV century A.D.) in his Sarva-darśana-saṃgrahaḥ, explains this particular position as follows (Abhyankar 1978:2-3 of the text): tatra pṛthivyādīni bhūtāni catvāri tattvāni | tebhya eva dehākārapariṇatebhyaḥ kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivac caitanyam upajāyate | teṣu vinaṣṭeṣu satsu svayaṃ vinaśyati | tad āhuḥ – vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānuvinaśyati na pretya saṃjñāstīti («There, the four elements – the earth and so on – are [thought to be] real. Only from these [elements, when they are] transformed into a human figure, originates the consciousness, like that which possesses an inebriating power [develops] from ferments, etc. When those [elements] are destroyed, this very [consciousness] disappears. This they say: “The consciousness [which is] solid, indeed, having been originated from these elements, it vanishes with [the disgregation of] them: after death there is not awareness” [Bṛhad-āraṇyaka-upaniṣad II, 4, 12]»). On this matter see also Kalupahana Notwithstanding Wayman’s reflections, I think that Nāgārjuna, instead of some non-Buddhist doctrines, is here (MMK I, 1) criticising some Buddhist ones and, in my opinion, the tenets of the Vaipulyaka sect, althought this school is not explicitly referred to by name, can give us an idea of what Nāgārjuna probably had in mind to reject.
(15) On account of MMK XV 3cd.
(16) When Nāgārjuna examines positions such as those of the Sautrāntikas, which uphold the existence only of so-called external conditions (parabhāvāḥ), he uses the term «condition» with the same – so to say – metaphysical weight that also the (Sarvāstivādin’s) term svabhāvaḥ has. See, for instance: MMK I, 2-6.
(17) Garfield (1994:222).
(18) MMK I, 3. See Chinn (2001:55): «Nāgārjuna has no problem talking about conditions having the power to bring about the effect», what he «warns against is confusing a functional property of the causal conditions with an existing, essential property, called “power to act”» (italics in the text). Chinn’s «power to act» reminds us the notion of arthakriyākāritvaṃ.
(19) Vṛttiḥ ad VV 22.
References 1 (texts):
– BV=Bodhicitta-vivaraṇaṃ: (1) Nāgārjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Lindtner, Chr., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1987, pp. 180-217; (2) Bodhicitta-Vivaraṇa of Ācārya Nāgārjuna and Bodhicitta-Bhāvanā of Ācārya Kamalaśīla, Namdol, G (ed. and Hindī trans. by), Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath (Varanasi) 1991.
Catuḥ-stavaḥ=(1) “The Catustava of Nāgārjuna”, in On Voidness: A Study on Buddhist Nihilism, Tola, F., Dragonetti, C. (ed. and Engl. trans. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1995, pp. 101-153; (2) Catuḥstavaḥ of Ācārya Nāgārjuna, Namdol, G. (Hindi trans. and critically ed. in Sanskrit and Tibetan), Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath (Varanasi) 2001.
– LS= Lokātīta-stavaḥ: see Catuḥ-stavaḥ.
– MMK=Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā: (1) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, de Jong, J.W. (ed. by), The Adyar Library and Research Center, Madras 1977; (2) Madhyamakaśāstram of Nāgārjuna. With the Commentaries Akutobhayā by Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakavṛtti by Buddhapālita, Prajñāpradīpavṛtti by Bhāvaviveka, Prasannapadāvṛtti by Candrakīrti, Critically Reconstructed (2 vols.), Pandeya, R. (ed. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1988; (3) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, The Philosophy of the Middle Way, Kalupahana, D.J. (ed. and Engl. trans. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1996 rist.; (4) Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavrtti. Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain, accompagnés d’une introduction, de notes, et d’une édition critique de la version tibétaine, May, J. (ed. and Franch trans. by), A. Maisonneuve, Paris 1959.
– SN=Saṃyutta-nikāyo: (1) Saṃyutta Nikāya (5 vols.), Feer, L. (vols. 2-5 ed. by), Pali Text Society, Oxford 1975-1999 (rep.), Somaratne, G.A., (vol. 1 ed. by), Pali Text Society, Oxford 1998; (2) Rhys Davids, C.A.F., Woodward, F.L. (2005), The Book of the Kindred Sayings (5 vols.), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.; (3) The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (2 vols.), Bhikkhu Bodhi (Engl. trans. by), Wisdom Publication, Boston 2000.
– Sarva-darśana-saṃgrahaḥ=Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, Abhyankar, V. S. (ed. with commentary in Sanskrit by) Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1978 (rep.)
– ŚS=Śūnyatā-saptati-kārikā: (1) Śūnyatāsaptatiḥ with Auto-Commentary of Ārya Nāgārjuna, Sempa Dorje (restored into Sanskrit, trans. into Hindi and ed. by), Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath (Varanasi) 1996 (rep.); (2) Nāgārjuna’s “Seventy Stanzas”. A Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness, Komito, D.R. (Engl. trans. and comm. by), Snow Lion Publications, Ithaca (New York) 1987.
– VS=Vaiśeṣika-sūtraṃ: Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda, Chakrabarty, D. (ed. and Engl. trans. by), D.K. Printworld, New Delhi 2003.
– VV=Vigraha-vyāvartanī: The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Bhattacharya, K., Lohnston, E.H., Kunst, A. (ed. and Engl. trans. by), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1990 (rep.)
References 2 (studies):
– Bharadwaja, V.K., Rationality, Argumentation and Embarrassment: A Study of Four Logical Alternatives (catuṣkoṭi) in Buddhist Logic, «Philosophy East and West» 34 (1984), pp. 303-319.
– Dasgupta, S., A History of Indian Philosophy vol. 1, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1997 (rep.)
– Garfield, J.L., Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why Did Nāgārjuna Start with Causation?, «Philosophy East and West» 44 (1994), pp. 219-250.
– Ghose, R., The Modality of Nāgārjuna’s Dialectics, «Journal of Indian Philosophy» 15 (1987), pp. 285-309.
– Jayatilleke, K.N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1998 (rist.)
– Kalupahana, D.J., Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1976.
– Lance Factor, R., What is “Logic” in Buddhist Logic?, »Philosophy East and West» 33 (1983), pp. 183-188.
– Murti, T.R.V., Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Allen & Unwin, London 1955.
– Potter, K.H. (ed. by), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies vol. IX, Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2003.
– Ramanan, K.V., Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy as Presented in the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1998 (rep.)
– Rigopoulos, A., The Avyākatāni and the Catuṣkoṭi Form in the Pāli Sutta Piṭaka II, «East and West» 43 (1993), pp. 115-140.
– Robinson, R.H., Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna’s System, «Philosophy East and West» 6 (1957), pp. 291-308.
– Seyfort Ruegg, D., The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism, «Journal of Indian Philosophy» 5 (1977), pp. 1–71.
– Shastri, D.N., Critique of Indian Realism, Agra University, Agra 1964.
– Siderits, M., Nāgārjuna as Anti-Realist, «Journal of Indian Philosophy» 16 (1988), pp. 311-325.
– Taber, J.A., On Nāgārjuna’s So-Called Fallacies: A Comparative Approach, «Indo-Iranian Journal» 41 (1998), pp. 213-144.
– Wayman, A., Who Understand the Four Alternatives of the Buddhist Texts?, «Philosophy East and West» 47 (1997), pp. 3-21.