Buddhist philosophy and psychology · Buddhist Texts · Cārvāka/Lokāyata

♦ The svabhāvavāda as expounded in the Skhalita-pramathana-yuktā-hetu-siddhi

One of the works that happens to me to deal with from time to time is the Skhalita-pramathana-yuktā-hetu-siddhi, attributed to Āryadeva. Today I’d like to put forward few considerations on the svabhāvavāda section (pūrvapakṣa only) contained in this writing. In what follows I provide the critical edition, the translation and an explanation of the section:… Continue reading ♦ The svabhāvavāda as expounded in the Skhalita-pramathana-yuktā-hetu-siddhi

Buddhist philosophy and psychology · Buddhist Texts · lingua tibetica

♦ Madhyamakaratnapradīpa: an untraced quotation debating cittamātra from a Candrakīrtipāda’s work

In the 7th chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, a work traditionally attributed to Bhāviveka, while discussing some fundamental concepts of the cittamātra doctrine, the author inserts an interesting quotation which is attributed to (the tantric?) Candrakīrtipāda (zLa-ba-grags-pa’i-źal-sṅa-na). Unfortunately, the original text from which the citation was taken remains still untraced. Nevertheless, what is interesting here, is… Continue reading ♦ Madhyamakaratnapradīpa: an untraced quotation debating cittamātra from a Candrakīrtipāda’s work

Buddhist philosophy and psychology · indica lingua · lingua tibetica

♦ Few considerations on the Buddhist world: loko, lokaḥ, ’jig rten, shì jiàn

The term used by early Buddhists to refer to what we know as “world” is, usually, the Pāli term loko. This word has more or less the same semantic extent of the French monde whose meaning is both «world» and «people» (consider, for instance, the compounds loka-visargaḥ, «distruction of the world» and loka-vikruṣṭaḥ, «offensive for… Continue reading ♦ Few considerations on the Buddhist world: loko, lokaḥ, ’jig rten, shì jiàn

Buddhist philosophy and psychology · Buddhist Texts · indica lingua · lingua tibetica

♦ Some open reflections on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4ab

Let us consider Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4ab, where Nāgārjuna seems to accept a sort of “priority” of hetu on both pratyaya and utpanna: hetāv asati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate | («when the [primary] cause does not exist, both the effect and the [secondary] cause are not evident»). Jacques May, reflecting on this half a… Continue reading ♦ Some open reflections on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4ab

Buddhist philosophy and psychology

♦ Nāgārjuna on cause/condition: moral implications

According to Nāgārjuna, only a modifiable (not permanently identical with, nor permanently different from, himself/herself) person can be a concrete enjoyer of good and bad results of his/her own actions. But to be modifiable means to lack svabhāvaḥ. Now, to avoid both the svabhāvaḥ and the parabhāvaḥ positions, Nāgārjuna prefers to adopt a “neither A,… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on cause/condition: moral implications

Buddhist philosophy and psychology

♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (2)

If it is true that both the Pāli Canon and Nāgārjuna consider the conditional relations on the basis of the positive and negative (α and β) twofold formulae (αβ.1 and αβ.2) (see Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (1)), nonetheless between the two perspectives there is a crucial difference: although, according to SN I,… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (2)

Buddhist philosophy and psychology

♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (1)

Let us consider the Pāli Canon (see also: A brief note on the distinction between “cause” and “condition” in early Buddhism). The kind of relation indicated by the term “condition” is in the canonical literature pointed out generally in two manners, a positive and a negative one. The (α) positive way runs as follows: imasmiṃ… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (1)