Buddhist philosophy and psychology · Buddhist Texts · indica lingua · lingua tibetica

♦ Some open reflections on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4ab

Let us consider Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4ab, where Nāgārjuna seems to accept a sort of “priority” of hetu on both pratyaya and utpanna: hetāv asati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate | («when the [primary] cause does not exist, both the effect and the [secondary] cause are not evident»). Jacques May, reflecting on this half a… Continue reading ♦ Some open reflections on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4ab

Buddhist philosophy and psychology

♦ Nāgārjuna on cause/condition: moral implications

According to Nāgārjuna, only a modifiable (not permanently identical with, nor permanently different from, himself/herself) person can be a concrete enjoyer of good and bad results of his/her own actions. But to be modifiable means to lack svabhāvaḥ. Now, to avoid both the svabhāvaḥ and the parabhāvaḥ positions, Nāgārjuna prefers to adopt a “neither A,… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on cause/condition: moral implications

Buddhist philosophy and psychology

♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (1)

Let us consider the Pāli Canon (see also: A brief note on the distinction between “cause” and “condition” in early Buddhism). The kind of relation indicated by the term “condition” is in the canonical literature pointed out generally in two manners, a positive and a negative one. The (α) positive way runs as follows: imasmiṃ… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (1)

Buddhist philosophy and psychology

♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars destruens (2)

Let us examine one by one the four alternatives listed by Nāgārjuna in his MMK I,1 (and referred to in Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars destruens (1)).1 (1) The alternative na svatas («not from itself») is clearly the rejection of the Sarvāstivāda-like position. Here Nāgārjuna criticizes the conception of svabhāvaḥ («intrinsic nature»). If the… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars destruens (2)

Buddhist philosophy and psychology

♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars destruens (1)

As far as the causal and conditional dependence between effect and cause is concerned, we have to note that the conception of svabhāvaḥ, and consequently of parabhāvaḥ (as a preliminary discussion see A brief note on the distinction between “cause” and “condition” in early Buddhism), during Nāgārjuna’s times had developed some problematic aspects, which Nāgārjuna… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars destruens (1)

Buddhist philosophy and psychology

♦ A brief note on the distinction between “cause” and “condition” in early Buddhism

When we speak of “relation” in Buddhism, we mainly refer to what in Pāli language is called paṭicca-samuppādo, in Sanskrit pratītya-samutpādaḥ, and in Tibetan rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba (or, in short, rten ’brel). The term pratītya-samutpādaḥ litterally means «conditioned co-production» or «dependent co-origination», and indicates the particular nature of the relation existing among… Continue reading ♦ A brief note on the distinction between “cause” and “condition” in early Buddhism