To solve the problem of who the author of the Skhalitapramathanayuktāhetusiddhi (SPHYS) was, is a very difficult task. In order to fix a starting point, however, let us begin by admitting that his name was really Āryadeva, as is referred in all the colophons.1 Moreover, I take for granted that he was a later namesake… Continue reading ♦ The third Āryadeva!
In what follows, I provide the English translation of some passages from Avalokitavrata’s Ṭīkā on Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakarika, from which some apparently discordant perspectives on the theory of causation of *Lokākṣa (’Jig rten mig), a mahārṣi among the Lokāyatas, are outlined. This is only a preliminary and incomplete collection (based only on the… Continue reading ♦ Lokākṣa on causation: Avalokitavrata’s apparently discordant perspectives
In a previous post I have taken into consideration Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4 in its Sanskrit and Tibetan versions. The Sanskrit texts runs thus: hetāv asati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate | tadabhāve kriyā kartā karaṇaṃ ca na vidyate || That is: If there is no cause, both effect and cause are not found;… Continue reading ♦ To conclude on Mūlamadhyamakakārika VIII, 4: philosophical notes
If we compare de Jong’s and de la Vallée Poussin’s editions of MMK, 4cd (we have already dealt with this kārikā here), we can notice the following difference: de Jong: hetāv asati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate | tadabhāve kriyā kartā kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate || de la Vallée Poussin: hetāv asati kāryaṃ ca… Continue reading ♦ Again on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4 (in brief)
Let us consider Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4ab, where Nāgārjuna seems to accept a sort of “priority” of hetu on both pratyaya and utpanna: hetāv asati kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ ca na vidyate | («when the [primary] cause does not exist, both the effect and the [secondary] cause are not evident»). Jacques May, reflecting on this half a… Continue reading ♦ Some open reflections on Mūlamadhyamakakārikā VIII, 4ab
According to Nāgārjuna, only a modifiable (not permanently identical with, nor permanently different from, himself/herself) person can be a concrete enjoyer of good and bad results of his/her own actions. But to be modifiable means to lack svabhāvaḥ. Now, to avoid both the svabhāvaḥ and the parabhāvaḥ positions, Nāgārjuna prefers to adopt a “neither A,… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on cause/condition: moral implications
If it is true that both the Pāli Canon and Nāgārjuna consider the conditional relations on the basis of the positive and negative (α and β) twofold formulae (αβ.1 and αβ.2) (see Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (1)), nonetheless between the two perspectives there is a crucial difference: although, according to SN I,… Continue reading ♦ Nāgārjuna on “cause” and “condition”: pars construens (2)